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JU' DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
that he did not make the contract.'5 On our particular issue, he states
that, "Successful fraud can indeed be consummated by employing a third
party to sign as agent and then to testify that he was authorized; but
there is more danger in attempting to induce a third party to commlit
forgery and perjury than in perpetrating those crimes oneself."2 6
Thus Wallis v. Bosler,2 7 by a broad interpretation where a. narrower
one would not only have reached a more just result but would still have
maintained the essential guarantees against fraud, is one-more case added
to the multitude where the Statute of Frauds has been converted into a
"sword" rather than the "shield" for which it was designed.28
DESCENT-RIGHT OF ILLEGITIMATES TO INHERIT
The deceased Bertha Spencer's illegitimate half brother and the lawful
grandchildren of her illegitimate half sister intervened in an effort to
recover from Bertha's estate. Their claim was asserted under the Illinois
statute which allows illegitimate children to inherit from their mother and
all maternal ancestors. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the term
"maternal ancestor" meant only lineal ascendants and therefore denied
the intervenors' petition. Spencer v. Burns, 413 111. 240, 108 N.E. 2d 413
(1952).
At common law att illegitimate was without parents, kindred or family
and thus did not inherit from anyone; not even his mother.'
This common law disability of illegitimates to inherit continued in Illi-
nois until 1829, when, by section 47 of the act relative to wills and testa-
ments, 2 it was provided that the illegitimate child, or children, of an un-
married &qoman shoOld be deemed capable of inheriting from the estate
of his deceased mother.
Then, in 1.853, an act was passed which establshed the rules of descent
of all property of any illegitimate person dying intestate by giving the
illegitimate's heirs the same rights as those granted to the heirs of a
legitimate person.8
25Code of Iowa (1924) c. 494, § 11288. "The oral evidence of the maker against
whom the unwritten contract is sought to be enforced shall be competent to
establish the same."
262 Corbin, Contracts S 525 (1950).
27 246 P. 2d 771 (Wyo., 1952).
28 Lightman, Statute of Frauds, A Sword Instead of A Shield, 74 L.J. 182, 194-5,
205-6 (1932).
1 People v. Moczek, 407 I11. 373, 95 N.E. 2d 428 (1950); Murrell v. Industrial Com-
mission, 291 11. 334, 126 N.E. 189 (1920); Gorden v. Gorden, 283 II. 182, 119 N.E.
312 (1918); Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 I11. 229 (1882); In re Crapa's Estate, 344 Ill.
App. 503, 101 N.E. 2d 611 (1951).
2 I11. Rev. Laws (1829) p. 207, § 47, repealed.
3 111. Laws (1853) p. 255, S 1, repealed.
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The laws remained in that state until the Descent Act of 18724 was
passed. Section 2 of this act consolidated the two previous rules and ex-
tended the inheritance rights of illegitimates to any one from whom the
mother might have inherited if living.
When the above mentioned section of the Descent Act was revised and
consolidated into the Probate Act 5 in 1940, it produced the statute in
controversy before the Illinois Supreme Court in the instant case.
The former Illinois Descent Act of 1872 provided that:
An illegitimate child shall be the heir of its mother and any maternal
ancestor, and of any person from whom its mother might have inherited if
living.6
The revised section in the Probate Act reads:
An illegitimate child shall be the heir of its mother and any maternal an-
cestor, and in all cases where representation is provided for by this act an
illegitimate child represents its mother.
7
The petitioners contend that a legitimate sister of their mother is a "ma-
ternal ancestor" and they are therefore entitled to inherit under the 1940
Probate Act.
The contentions of the petitioners, which were denied by the Illinois
Supreme Court in the present case, have been sustained by the Illinois
courts in similar factual situations.8 However, all such decisions are based
upon the former statute, and give no consideration to the clause referring
to "maternal ancestors." They rely upon the phrase "and of any person
from whom its mother might have inherited if living" which is omitted
in the new act.
The Spencer case is the first to come before the Illinois Supreme Court
in which this revised section was in issue. On one prior occasion, how-
ever, an Illinois Appellate Court was called upon to interpret the same
provision. In the case of Calamia v. Dempsey,9 the court first reasoned
that statutes are to be construed according to their intent and meaning,
and that therefore a situation which is within the object, spirit and
meaning of a statute is regarded within the statute evn though not
within the letter.10 The court held that the term "maternal ancestor"
could be construed to mean correlative heirs, or any one from whom the
mother might have inherited if living. It has been stated that this inter-
pretation was adopted so as to conform with the intention of the drafters
of the Probate Act merely to change the statute in form and not in
substance."
4111. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 39, S 2.. 6111. Rev. Star. (1939) c. 39, § 2.
5111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 3, S 163. 7IU. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 3, § 163.
8 Morrow v. Morrow, 289 111. 135, 124 N.E. 386 (1919); Chambers v. Chambers,
249 IMl. 126, 94 N.E. 108 (1911); Bales v. Elder, 118 111. 436, 11 N.E. 421 (1887).
9 344 111. App. 503, 101 NE. 2d 611 (195i).
1OPeople v. Moczek, 407 I1. 373, 95 N.E. 2d 428 (1950).
11James, Illinois Probate Law and Practice, S 12 (1951).
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The Illinois Supreme Court, although never called upon to review the
Calamia case, 1 2 specifically denied this interpretation in the instant case,
and stated that, although the statutes regarding inheritance by illegiti-
mates are not to be construed with the same strictness as others which are
in derogation of the common law, there are substantial changes in the
new act which prevent recovery on these' facts. The court based its inter-
pretation of the "maternal ancestor" phrase on a decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts 13 which, in a case similar to the instant
case stated:
The words "maternal ancestor" are manifestly limited to progenitors, or an-
cestors in the direct ascending line, according to their common meaning and
the only sense in which the word "ancestor" is used throughout the statute of
descents .... 14
The Massachusetts statute so interpreted is very similar to the Illinois Act
here in controversy. 15
Since the courts, in the early decisions upholding the petitioner's con-
tentions, did not rely upon the "maternal ancestor" clause of the 1872
Illinois Act, it is reasonable to assume that the courts did not believe it
applicable. Further, if the term "maternal ancestor" is to be construed as
meaning any person from whom the illegitimate's mother might have in-
herited if living, then the legislature in drafting the 1872 Descent Act16
was clearly redundant which is a thing not lightly ascribed to a legislative
body. 17 Hence it would seem reasonably necessary to construe the
"maternal ancestor" clause to mean solely lineal ascendants of the ille-
gitimate's mother and the now omitted clause to mean, lineal ascendants,
lineal descendants, and collaterals of the illegitimate's mother, thus, caus-
ing the two clauses to overlap but not be redundant.
In the Calamia case the court made a statement to the effect that the
trend of modern legislation and interpretation by courts of legislative
enactments in relation to descent and illegitimacy has been toward liberal
construction involhing the rights of illegitimates.
Our present case recognizes this trend. However, this liberal rule of
construction only requires that a statute be so enforced as to carry into
effect the will of the legislature as expressed in the terms thereof. Also,
since it is not within the province of an administrative agency or court to
12344 I11. App. 503, 101 N.E. 2d 611 (1951).
"3Pratt v. Atwood, 108 Mass. 40 (1871). This case denied recovery to the legiti-
mate children of an illegitimate of any share in the estate of a legitimate child of the
illegitimate's mother.
14 Ibid., at 42.
iS Mass. Pub. Stat. (1882) c. 125, § 3. "An illegitimate child shall be heir of his
mother and of any maternal ancestor .. .
10Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 39, § 2.
17 40 Ill. Bar Journal 289 (1951).
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take from or enlarge the meaning of a statute by reading into it language
which will, in the opinion of either, correct any supposed omission or
defect,18 and since the legislature in its new enactment departed substan-
tially from the expression of policy as stated in the Descent Act19 without
any indication that this departure was unintentional, the court seems justi-
fied in assuming that the departure was intentional.
Thus it can be seen that Illinois has progressed from the strict rule of
the common law which denied inheritance entirely, into a very liberal
policy, and then seemingly, has dropped back one notch in the cycle. It
will now be up to the legislature in the next session to determine whether
or not Illinois will follow the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court or
will follow the trend toward liberalization of the rules regarding illegiti-
mates, by revising the Probate Act.
PUBLIC LAW-EFFECT OF ZONING ORDINANCE
AMENDMENTS ON BUILDING PERMITS
The plaintiffs sought judicial declaration that the defendant company
had no vested right by virtue of its building permit to construct a manu-
facturing building in an area zoned for family dwellings. The plaintiffs
contended that the building permit had been subsequently revoked by an
ordinance amendment. However, prior to the effective date of the
amendatory ordinance, the defendant, relying upon a building permit
issued in accordance with the zoning regulations then in force, had
caused substantial work to be done on the premises. The Appellate Court
of Illinois held that the defendant had acquired a vested right under the
permit. The subsequent amendment could not effectively revoke the
building permit. Deer Park Civic Assoc. v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App.
346, 106 N.E. 2d 823 (1952).
The problem here presented is a controversial one, and the courts are
not in complete agreement as to how it should be resolved.' Although
they agree that a person should be protected against an amendatory
ordinance revoking his building permit where he, in reliance upon such
permit, has caused substantial work to be done on his premises, there is a
1s American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 III. 174, 88 N.E. 2d 465 (1949).
19 111. Rev. Star. (1939) c. 39, S 2.
1 Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924);
Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 110 Conn. 130, 147 Atl. 513 (1929); Crow v.
Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324, 288 N.W. 145 (1939); City of
Omaha v. Glissaninn, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W. 2d 828 (1949); Howe Realty Co. v.
Nashville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S.W. 2d 904 (1940); Fairchild Sons v. Rogers, 246
App. Div. 555, 282 N.Y. Supp. 916 (S. Ct., 1935); Southern Leasing Co. v. Ludwig,
168 App. Div. 233, 153 N.Y. Supp. 545 (S. Ct., 1915); Rice v. Van Vranken, 132
Misc. 82, 229 N.Y. Supp. 32 (S. Ct., 1928).
